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DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO BE PRESENT IN NEW
YORK: A "CONSTATUTORY" RIGHT
INTRODUCT[ON
Imagine, in the time of King Arthur, there existed a brave
knight named Sir Phillip Helmsley. He possessed a razor sharp
sword of hardened, exotic steel which struck fear in the hearts of
those forced to face him in battle.
One twi-night, he left the watering hole and passed by two
drunkards who derided him for no reason. Who were they to
question his power? His eyes filled with fury and theirs with utter
terror. Without so much as a word, he calmly withdrew his
sword from its sheath and buried it deep within the one named
Owens who fell dead to the earth with a shriek and a gasp. The
other ran as fast as he possibly could - to the constable.
The hue and cry went out for Sir Helmsley who to.ok refuge.
Had they found him, he would have had to endure the agonizing
fire ordeal. 1 He would have to hold in his bare and tender flesh,
chunks of glowing ore.2 Because he failed to surrender himself
he was considered an outlaw3 - he was reviled. The hero of the
kingdom could now be killed on sight.4 However, regardless of
his outlawry status he could not be deemed guilty of any crime. 5
Representation by barrister was forbidden6 and the trial by ordeal
could not commence in his absence. 7 Was his presence at trial
necessary?
Flash forward seven hundred years to the early mqrning hours
of January 27, 1989. Donald Favor accosted a young girl, held a
1. See infra note 33.
2. See infra note 33.
3. See infra text accompanying note 39.
4. See infra text accompanying note 39.
5. See infra note 39.
6. See infra text accompanying note 51.
7. See infra text accompanying note 33.
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knife to her throat, forced her down a driveway and brutally
raped her. 8
The victim, though horribly shaken, managed to describe her
assailant to the police who arrested the perpetrator. 9 Shortly after
the arrest, the victim identified Favor in a lineup.10 He was
indicted for five crimes, including two violent rapes perpetrated
upon two different individuals. 11 Favor was convicted of one of
the rapes based on the testimony of one of the victims and shortly
thereafter, plead guilty to the other violent crimes. 12
Before jury selection, the court held an in camera Sandoval
hearing 13 with defense counsel and the prosecutor to determine
which, if any, of Favor's prior convictions would be cross-
examinable if he took the stand. 14 Favor was not present at this
proceeding, however, he was present in the courtroom when the
judge read into the record, the results of the prior conference held
in chambers. 15 The prosecutor was only permitted to ask whether
defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor.1 6 Defense
counsel neither objected to defendant's absence at the hearing,
nor requested review of the extremely favorable ruling. 17
Donald Favor, a confessed rapist, was convicted at trial. 18 The
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the guilty
8. People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254, 269, 624 N.E.2d 631, 640, 604
N.Y.S.2d 494, 503 (1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. Id.
l1. Id.
12. Id.
13. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 374, 314 N.E.2d 413, 416, 357
N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (1974) (holding that "in the exercise of... discretion a
Trial Judge may... make an advance ruling as to the use by the prosecutor of
prior convictions or proof of the prior commission of specific criminal, vicious
or immoral acts for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's credibility").
14. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 269, 624 N.E.2d at 640, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 503
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
15. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
16. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 270, 624 N.E.2d at 640, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
18. Id. at 259, 624 N.E.2d at 633, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
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verdict.19 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction and automatically granted defendant a new trial.2 0 The
reversal was based on a court of appeals holding, decided three
years after defendant was originally convicted, which demanded a
defendant's presence at Sandoval hearings. 2 1 Was Favor's
presence at the Sandoval hearing really necessary?
This Comment focuses on a criminal defendant's right to be
present pursuant to the New York State Constitution as
interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals. More
specifically, this Comment will discuss whether a defendant's
right to be present in New York is constitutionally based pursuant
to the State Constitution as it is applied to various criminal
proceedings. To this end, it will prove helpful to analyze and
distinguish cases where the court has accepted a defendant's New
York State statutory claim of the right to be present22 - rather
19. People v. Favor, 172 A.D.2d 1052. 571 N.Y.S.2d 408 (4th Dep't
1991), rev'd, 82 N.Y.2d 254, 624 N.E.2d 631, 604 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1993).
20. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 268, 624 N.E.2d at 640, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
21. Id. at 267, 624 N.E.2d at 639, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 502. See People v.
Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1992)
(demanding defendant's presence at Sandoval hearings).
22. N.Y. Cim. PROC. LAw § 260.20 (McKinney 1993). Section 260.20
provides:
A defendant must be personally present during the trial of an
indictment; provided, however, that a defendant who conducts himself
in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if,
after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he
continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.
Id. (amending N.Y. CrUM. PROC. LAW 789 § 1 (1971)). The 1971 amendment
inserted:
[Pirovided, however, that a defendant who conducts himself in so
disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on
with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after
he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues
such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.
Id. (amending N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW 996 § 1 (1970)). See Maurer v.
People, 43 N.Y. 1 (1870) (relying on 2 REV. STAT. 759, § 13 Edmonds'
Edition providing in pertinent part that "no person indicted for any felony can
be tried, unless he be personally present during such trial").
1995] 677
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than accepting, rejecting, or glossing over New York State
constitutional arguments. At times, statutory and constitutional
assertions of the right to be present seem to be interchangeable
because both afford the criminal defendant due process. 23 Even
more confusing is the fact that the origins of both the statutory
and constitutional rights are identical. 24
Further, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the right to be present25 is relevant only so far as New York State
Besides a New York defendant's right to be present at trial, various
codifications aim to help the defendant by requiring his presence at other
times. For example: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 600.20, 340.20, 220.50
(McKinney 1993) (permitting corporate defendants to appear by counsel);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.40 (McKinney 1993) (requiring presence of
defendant at People's motion to set aside sentence); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAv
§ 440.30 (McKinney 1993) (demanding defendant's presence at motion to
vacate judgment and to set aside sentence); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.40
(McKinney 1993) (demanding presence of defendant at sentencing); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.50 (McKinney 1993) (requiring defendant's presence
at trial); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.20 (McKinney 1993) (demanding
defendant's presence at plea to information in local criminal courts); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.40 (McKinney 1993) (directing defendant's presence
at rendition of verdict); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 1993)
(requiring defendant's presence during jury deliberation where a request for
information is made); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50 (McKinney 1993)
(requiring defendant's presence at a plea to an indictment); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc.
LAW § 210.10 (McKinney 1993) (requiring presence of defendant at
arraignment upon indictment); N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 170.10 (McKinney
1993) (directing defendant's presence at arraignment upon information,
simplified traffic information, prosecutor's information, or misdemeanor
complaint).
23. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 practice commentary
(McKinney 1993); see also infra note 63 (referring to the blurred line between
constitutional and statutory arguments for the right to be present).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 31-61.
25. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (requiring
defendant's presence "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably
substantial, to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the
charge"). But see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding
that due process does not require that the defendant be present at a criminal
contempt hearing); Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928) (stating that a
defendant cannot claim he was not present to hear evidence after the conviction
was affirmed by the state supreme court); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442
(1912) (finding that "where the offense is not capital and the accused is not in
678 [Vol 11
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has adopted the Court's rationale, 26 and as a frame of reference
for determining when the right may be successfully asserted
federally, vis a vis, in New York.
Part I will discuss the origins of a criminal defendant's right to
be pre ent under the New York State Constitution, and why the
right has been deemed fundamental. 27 Part II will examine
instances where the right has bedn applied. 28 Part III will explore
whether the right is constitutionally or statutorily based, and why,
if at all, the basis makes a difference. 29 Part IV will touch upon
how a defendant can voluntarily or involuntarily waive or forfeit
his or her right to be present. 30 Finally, this Comment will
conclude that the right to be present in New York is in a state of
flux, progressing from a "constatutory" right to an absolute
statutory right.
I. ORIGINS OF TEE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
The requirement that a criminal defendant be personally present
during a felony trial has ancient roots. The Ancient Hebrews
brought the accused before the tribunal upon rendition of the
verdict. 31 The defendant's presence was necessary at each step of
the proceeding which was to result in his condemnation or
exculpation, otherwise, the tribunal could render no verdict. 32
custody, the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in his
presence he voluntarily absents himself... [it] operates as a waiver of his
right to be present .... "); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892)
(holding that a defendant does not have a right to be present when an appellate
court affins his sentence).
26. See, e.g., People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 559 N.E.2d 836, 584
N.Y.S.2d 761 (1992) (employing Snyder rationale in determining whether the
right to be present is applicable in a Sandoval hearing).
27. See infra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 62-92 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 93-284 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 285-99 and accompanying text.
31. See SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
ANCmNTHEBREWS 148 (1961).
32. Gullie B. Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the
Verdict in Felony Cases, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 18, 18-19 (1916).
19951 679
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In the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, English methods of
trial by battle or ordeal dictated .that the defendant be present. 33
Society perceived criminal matters not as offenses against the
state, but as offenses against the individual. 34 The method used
for adjudicating a defendant's guilt or innocence demonstrated the
reason why his presence was necessary as "it [was] evident that
neither could a trial be had nor a verdict reached without the
actual presence of the accused. This resulted from the nature of
the trial, which was a combat, and every combat presupposed the
presence of two combatants, of whom the accused was one." 35
Ranging back to the middle ages, the root of a defendant's
compulsory attendance, was a crude sense of justice. 36 As a
matter of right, it was necessary that the defendant be present, for
it was unfair that he be condemned in his absence. 37
The jury system gradually developed in England and the
presence of the defendant was absolutely necessary so that the
judge, who was a private arbitrator, first, could decide the
dispute, second, could have power over the defendant, and
finally, so that the defendant could choose whether to "wage
battle" or defend himself with the help of "oath with helpers." 38
However, if the defendant failed to surrender himself, he was
33. Id. at 18. Trial by ordeal emerged in Saxon and old English law. It
was one of the most ancient species of trials which presupposed that
supernatural intervention would rescue an innocent person from the danger of
physical harm to which he was exposed - fire ordeal or water deal. Fire ordeal
was confined to persons of higher rank-and forced such persons to either hold
in hand, pieces of red-hot iron or walk barefoot and blindfolded over nine red-
hot plowshares, laid lengthwise at unequal distances. Hot-water ordeal was
performed by putting one's arm in boiling water and escaping unhurt while
cold-water ordeal was performed by throwing the accused in a river or pond
and if he sunk he was acquitted and if he floated without swimming it was
deemed evidence of his guilt.
34. See People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 348, 334 N.E.2d 566, 570, 372
N.Y.S.2d 606, 611 (1975).
35. See Goldin, supra note 32, at 19. In England by 1219, the clergy had
succeeded in having trial by ordeal abolished, leaving only trial by battle. See
I LUKE OWEN PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 204 (1983).
36. Goldin, supra note 32, at 19-20.
37. Goldin, supra note 32, at 20.
38. Goldin, supra note 32, at 19 (citation omitted).
680 [Vol 11
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considered an outlaw, "a person who was beyond the pale of all
law and who could be dealt with summarily in any fashion by any
person who chanced to meet him."39
The advent of the common law courts brought with it the
concept of jurisdiction and the right of the accused to be present.
This was necessary to "prevent [the evil of] secret trials in which
the accused was often arrested and executed without a hearing
and without any knowledge as to who were his accusers, or the
evidence upon which they relied." 40 Furthermore, without the
defendant's presence at every step of the trial, the court lacked
the jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution. 41 Lord Hale
proclaimed that, "'[i]n a case of a felony or treason the verdict
must- be given in open court, and no privy verdict can be
given.'" 42 A verdict so rendered could be characterized as a
default judgment, which was repugnant at common law.43 At
early common law, the judgment was handed down immediately
upon the return of the verdict, and therefore, the defendant's
presence was once again required. 44
As early as 1828, New York State had squarely recognized that
a defendant had the right to be present at the rendition of the
verdict. In People v. Perkins,45 the Supreme Court of the State of
New York found that although many of the ancient forms of trial
were no longer used, the prisoner had a fundamental right to be
present when the verdict was received so that he could poll the
jury.46 The right to poll the jury was an ancient one with a basis
39. Goldin, supra note 32, at 20 (stating that if defendant failed to
surrender himself and thus, became an "outlaw," he was not deemed guilty
because of this failure) (citing POLLAcK & MATrLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 580 (2d ed. 1968) and MEmLVLLE M. BIGELow, HISTORY OF
PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 348 (1880)).
40. People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 297, 50 N.E. 947, 951 (1898); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 practice commentary (McKinney 1993).
41. Goldin, supra note 32, at 20.
42. Goldin, supra note 32, at 21 (citations omitted).
43. Goldin, supra note 32, at 21.
44. Goldin, supra note 32, at 23.
45. 1 Wend. 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
46. Id. at 92. In Perkins, the defendant was tried for perpetrating a capital
crime. The statute protected defendant's fundamental right to be present when
1995]
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in the belief that certain emotions overcome the jury when it
faces the defendant upon relating its verdict. 47
So, a defendant's right to be present has been deemed
fundamental at least insofar as it assists in protecting the sanctity
of other fundamental rights. Further, a defendant's compulsory
attendance at the verdict demonstrates a mistrust for juries who
tend to arrive at verdicts based on emotions or gut instinct,
instead of upon the law.
In 1878, the New York Court of Appeals held in Hinman v.
People,48 that, in a felony case, the defendant had to be present
at the giving of the verdict, because "[r]eceiving the verdict was
one, if [sic] the most important of the proceedings during the
trial. It must be received by the court before which the trial was
had, and if not the verdict is a nullity....- 49 Hinman stands for
the proposition that the presence of the accused was not one of
mere form even though the previous judicial and state procedural
abuses had been dispensed with. 50
such a decision of great magnitude was rendered, i.e., determining whether he
would live or die or even be placed in jail. Id.
By finding, through statutory interpretation, that defendant had a
fundamental right to be present at the verdict in order to alleviate past abuses,
the statute afforded the identical safeguards as would the Due Process Clause.
The statute was merely the vehicle used to assert the due process claim. It is
unclear whether any criminal defendant in New York had put forth a
constitutional right to be present claim by 1828. Rather, both the statute and
New York's Due Process Clause seemed to have as their bases "a rather sound
conception of justice" which required defendant's presence at the rendition of
the verdict. See Goldin, supra note 32, at 19.
So, the right to be present is fundamental in nature because it stems from a
primitive sense of fairness. See Goldin, supra note 32, at 19. One cannot say
with precision which clause and section of the constitution renders a right
fundamental, but it makes no difference. It is fundamental because the people
and law makers sensed that it was unfair to try a defendant or render a verdict
in his absence.
47. Goldin, supra note 32, at 23. Such a right helped to ensure that the
majority of the jury did not intimidate the loan dissenter. Goldin, supra note
32, at 23.
48. 13 Hun. 266 (N.Y. 1878).
49. Id. at 268.
50. But see Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 40 N.E. 766 (Mass. 1895). In
McCarthy, the court stated, in dictum, that "(tihis final act of the jury [was]
[Vol 11682
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A much more important reason for defendant's compulsory
attendance came to the forefront. In relatively recent times
criminal defendants had not been permitted to retain attorneys nor
request that one be appointed. Therefore, "[als no counsel was
allowed in that country (England) in those days to represent a
prisoner, and protect him, and he could only defend himself, the
courts then held that he must be in court whenever any step was
taken in his cause, however insignificant or unimportant." 5 1
The presence of the accused, who could have no counsel at his
side, was clearly fundamental, and manifested a mistrust, if not a
hatred for the prosecution by those invoking such a right. The
overzealous prosecutor would stop at nothing to convict the
helpless defendant who was hardly indoctrinated with the
subtleties of the arcane rules of evidence. Given the judicial
abuses of entertaining secret trials, the defendant had to be given
this right because his life or liberty was at stake. Those who
found or created a right to be present, in statute or from the New
York State Constitution, must have mistrusted the
establishment. 52 The United States had revolted against the
nothing more than a formal announcement of the result of a trial which, up to
that point, ha[d] proceeded with unquestionable regularity. There [was] no
very important reason for requiring the defendant's presence then." Id. at 767,
construed in Goldin, supra note 32, at 24.
51. Goldin, supra note 32, at 20. (citations omitted). See 3 WILUAM
BLACKSTONE, COMENTARY ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 25 (John L. Wendell
ed. 1847) (explaiiing that "[flormerly every suitor was obliged to appear in
person, to prosecute or defend his suit .... ).
52. See People v. Wilkes, 14 N.Y. Pr. 105 (1850). In Wilkes, the
defendant was convicted of libeling the late attorney general of the state. Id.
The defendant hired an attorney who fell ill and sent another attorney who was
completely unprepared to act in his stead. Id. at 106. The court denied the
postponement and rendered a verdict in the defendant's absence. Id. The court
strictly adhered to the statute which prohibited the trial of any defendant unless
he was personally present or duly authorized an attorney to appear for that
purpose. Id. at 107. The court found that this provision was "not satisfied with
an implied authority." Id. A general attorney would not be sufficient, for there
must be a "distinct and express authority over and above any general authority
as attorney or counsel in the cause .... "Id.
Aside from the fact that this was the first case to sanction, although in
dictum, a defendant's right to waive his right to be present, it more
19951 683
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Crown because of such abuses. Moreover, a criminal defendant's
right to be present has been concretized and is "found" in the
statutes or constitutions of many of the states and in the New
York State Constitution in article I, section 6. 53 Clearly, a
defendant's right to be present cannot be found explicitly in the
language of article I, section 6, however, defense attorneys, in an
attempt to give the court something to hang its proverbial hat on,
have pigeon-holed their claim of a denial of the right to be
present in this section. 54
Defendants who claimed a deprivation of the right to be
present, pursuant to article I, section 6 of the New York
Constitution, based their claims on a breach of the basic right to
confront adverse witnesses. In People v. Thorn,55 the defendant,
in an attempt to obtain a reversal of his murder conviction,
claimed that his absence from the jury's inspection of the crime
scene, violated New York's Confrontation Clause. 56 The
defendant claimed that the viewing of the crime scene was part of
the trial, therefore, his absence was error, meriting reversal and a
new trial. 57 In claiming that the inspection was part of the trial,
the defendant asserted that:
[The view of the jurors [could not] be considered an idle
ceremony, but must be deemed to have been made for a purpose,
and, taking place under an order of the court, [was] a part of the
trial; that the jurors in making such inspection necessarily made
use of their sense of sight, and, although no word may [have
importantly explained how this common law right was codified. Id. This
statute treated the common law right as a narrow one, which "seemed to
authorize the trial of the defendant in his absence, if he had once appeared."
Id.
53. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in relevant part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed
of the nature of the cause of the accusation and be confronted with the
witnesses against him." Id.
54. See, e.g., People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 334 N.E.2d 566, 372
N.Y.S.2d 606 (1975).
55. 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N.E. 947 (1898).
56. Id. at 290, 50 N.E. at 948.
57. Id.
684 [Vol 11
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been] spoken, they [drew] conclusions from the silent, inanimate
objects which they [saw]; that these objects [were] mute
witnesses with which the defendant must [have been]
confronted. 58
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's
contention and held that the purpose of the jury's investigation of
a crime scene was not to take in evidence, but rather, to better
understand the evidence presented by witnesses before them. 59
The court reasoned that:
If seeing is the taking of evidence, it would follow in every case
that a juror who had seen and was familiar with the locality
would be incompetent to sit as a juror, for he would have taken
testimony in the absence of the accused, with which he had never
been confronted, or had an opportunity to explain. 60
It matters not that defendant's claim was rejected in Thorn.
Although, after Thorn, criminal defendants did not enjoy a right
to be present when the jury viewed a crime scene, Thorn's
holding stood for the proposition that defendants have a
constitutional right to be present during the "trial." However, to
be imbued with this constitutional protection, a defendant first
had to prove that the proceeding or location from which he was
absent, was, as a matter of law, part of the "trial. "61 A multitude
of applications of this right to be present in various criminal
proceedings in New York will be discussed in Part H.
11. APPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
Defendants in New York State have argued that their right to
be present has been abridged in a variety of contexts. In many
cases, the New York Court of Appeals has found the right to be
58. Id. The defendant's position was argued and adopted in People v.
Palmer, 43 Hun. 397, 401 (1887).
59. Thom, 156 N.Y. at 298, 50 N.E. at 951.
60. Id. at 297-98, 50 N.E. at 951.
61. See id. at 289, 50 N.E. at 948.
19951 685
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constitutionally imbedded, 62 merely statutory in nature, 63 or
nonexistent in either legal framework. 64 Some of these cases
62. See People v. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871, 577 N.E.2d 55, 573 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1991). In Turaine, the court held that the defendant's New York State
constitutional right to be present was infringed when the court entertained a
hearing, in defendant's absence, to determine whether he intimidated a witness
to prevent the witness from testifying. Id. at 872, 577 N.E.2d at 56, 573
N.Y.S.2d at 65. The court found that "[piroceedings where testimony is
received are material stages of the trial because defendant's presence is
necessary so that he or she may confront adverse witnesses and advise counsel
of any inconsistencies, errors or falsehoods in their testimony." Id.; People v.
Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 553 N.E.2d 974, 554 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1990) (holding
that it was fundamentally unfair to exclude the defendant's counsel from voir
dire hearing after four witnesses testified as to possible taint of impaneled
jury); People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 418 N.Y.S.2d
371 (1979). In Ciaccio, the New York Court of Appeals found a violation of
defendant's constitutional right to be present when the court clerk entered the
jury room during deliberations and told jurors, in defendant's absence, that the
"[j]udge had stated that a lot of time and money [were] invested in the case and
they should keep on deliberating." Id. at 435-36, 391 N.E.2d at 1349, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 373. The court reasoned that this type of supplemental instruction
may have been dispositive of the matter and, therefore, the presence of both
the defendant and his counsel were constitutionally required. Id. at 436-37,
391 N.E.2d at 1350, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
63. See, e.g., People v. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759, 505 N.E.2d 610, 513
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1987). The Mehmedi court held, inter alia, that defendant's
statutory right to be present, under Criminal Procedure Law § 310.30, was
violated when the court and defense counsel responded to a jury question
during deliberations in the defendant's absence. Id. at 759, 505 N.E.2d at 610-
11, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100-01. Criminal Procedure Law § 310.30 provides in
pertinent part:
At any time during its deliberation, the jury may request the court for
further instruction or information.... Upon such a request, the court
must direct that the jury be returned to the courtroom and, after notice
to both the people and counsel for the defendant, and in the presence of
the defendant, must give such requested information or instruction as
the court deems proper....
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 1993). The court found that this
was a material part of defendant's trial such that he had to be present and
harmless error analysis was inapplicable. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d at 760, 505
N.E.2d at 610-11, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
Mehmedi illustrates the blurred analysis with respect to whether the court of
appeals vindicated the defendant's statutory or constitutional right to be
present. The court held that the trial judge violated defendant's right to be
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present under Criminal Procedure Law § 310.30 but then explained, in thl
same paragraph, that the right is fundamental and harmless error analysis was
inappropriate. Id. at 760, 505 N.E.2d at 11, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 101. Clearly,
the court of appeals found that denial of defendant's right to be present during
jury instruction was a per se constitutional error;, see also People v. Anderson,
16 N.Y.2d 282, 213 N.E.2d 445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1965). Defendant's
statutory right to be present pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure § 356,
which provided that, "at a trial for a felony 'the defendant must be personally
present,'" was violated when defendant was absent from a motion to suppress.
Id. at 286-86, 213 N.E.2d at 446, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 111-12; CODE OF CRIM.
PRoc. § 356 (McKinney 1958) (current version at N.Y. CRhlM. PROC. LAW
§ 260.20 (McKinney 1993)). Tie court found that because the motion to
suppress took place before trial it did not constitute the taking of evidence
"during trial." Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d at 286-87, 213 N.E.2d at 447, 266
N.Y.S.2d at 112-13. The court reasoned that such analysis ignores the
purposes of the right to be present because the evidence elicited at a
suppression hearing "'may spell the difference between conviction or
acquittal.'" Id. at 287, 213 N.E.2d at 447, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (quoting
People v. Lombardi, 18 A.D.2d 177, 180, 239 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (2d Dep't),
qft'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1014, 195 N.E.2d 306, 245 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1963). This
precious right is not lost or any less important merely because the Legislature
enacted § 813-d which requires that a, "motion to suppress be made and a
hearing held in advance of the actual trial." Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d at 286, 213
N.E.2d at 447, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
This case, as well as the landmark cases of People ex rel. Bartlan v.
Murphy, 9 N.Y.2d 550, 175 N.E.2d 336, 215 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1961) and
People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253, 196 N.E.2d 56, 246 N.Y.S.2d
399 (1963) are really due process cases argued by defense counsel under the
aegis of § 356, an earlier codified version of the right to be present. In Lupo,
the court of appeals adopted the test elucidated, ironically, by its former Chief
Judge, Justice Cardozo, in the Supreme Court case of Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). The Lupo court held:
Due process... mandates the presence of a defendant.., to the extent
only that his presence [be] necessary for a fair and just hearing of his
cause and he must be deemed to have the absolute right to hear
everything ... so that his may be the opportunity to confront his
accusers and advise with his counsel.
13 N.Y.2d at 256, 196 N.E.2d at 58, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 401 (citing Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)). In other words, the Lupo court did not
pass on the defendant's claimed deprivation of the right to be present by
merely stating that (1) defendant had a statutory right to be present during the
trial, (2) defendant was absent during argument by his counsel for a mistrial,
and (3) therefore defendant's statutory right to be present vras violated. Tie
court conducted an entire Snyder due process analysis to see if defendant's
13
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presence could have contributed to the fairness of the proceeding in any way.
Id. at 256-57, 196 N.E.2d at 58-59, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 401-02. By adopting the
Snyder constitutional analysis to construe the "required presence" statute, the
court of appeals constructed a statutory right that had constitutional
underpinnings.
64. See, e.g., People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 623 N.H.2d 519, 603
N.Y.S.2d 392 (1993). Defendant's right to be present at trial was not violated
when the trial court spoke to a sworn juror immediately prior to deliberations
regarding her anxiety about her health and having to deliberate late into the
night. Id. at 29, 623 N.E.2d at 522, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 395. The court found
that the record was devoid of evidence that defendant's presence might have
had an effect on his opportunity to defend against die charges. Id. at 34, 623
N.E.2d at 525, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 398; see also People v. Torres, 80 N.Y.2d
944, 605 N.E.2d 354, 590 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1992). In Torres, The defendant's
right to be present at all material stages 6f the trial was not violated when trial
court questioned a juror, in defendant's absence, about whether she knew
defendant. Id. at 945, 605 N.E.2d at 355, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 868. The court
reasoned that the inquiry was limited to only one question and one answer, off
the record, and resulted in the dismissal of the juror, with the consent of both
parties. Id. Although left unsaid, the court probably focused on the subject
matter of the conversation instead of its mere duration; People v. Nacey, 78
N.Y.2d 990, 580 N.E.2d 751, 575 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1991) (holding that
defendant's right to be present was not abridged when a court officer, at the
judge's instruction, undertook the mere ministerial duty of telling the jury to
discontinue deliberations for the evening); People v. Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d
26, 574 N.E.2d 1027, 571 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1991) (same). These decisions are
consistent with the body of case law dealing with a defendant's right to be
present during a judge's dialogue with the jury dealing with matters wholly
unrelated to the merits. See People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d
660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990) (holding that when a jury requests additional
information the court should reconvene prior to discussion between judge and
jury); People v. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918, 564 N.E.2d 658, 563 N.Y.S.2d
98 (1990) (concluding defendant's right to be present does not attach at a
colloquy Petween his attorney and the trial judge to determine sufficiency of
read-back testimony because his absence did not affect his ability to defend
himself against the charges); People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d
369, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1978) (finding that defendant's statutory right to be
present was not infringed when defendant was absent from the in-chambers
questioning of a seated juror for possible disqualification because the inquiry
was not part of formal jury selection and defendant's presence would be
superfluous); People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253, 196 N.E.2d 56,
246 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1963) (concluding that defendant's absence from mistrial
hearing where the judge told the jury to continue deliberating although the
jurors had complained of fatigue was not violative of his statutory right to be
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were also brought under New York State statutes requiring a
defendant's presence at various criminal proceedings. Examples
of which are discussed below.
In 1990, the New York Court of Appeals held, in People v.
Haris,65 that defendant's constitutional and statutory right to be
present was not abridged when, in defendant's absence, the trial
judge went to the door of the jury room and requested
clarification of a read back request. 66 The court found the judge's
communication with the jury to be purely ministerial and that the
jury was given no information or instruction in defendant's
absence. 67
However, in 1990, the court in People v. Cain,68 held that the
defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present were
violated when supplemental instructions were given to a single
juror before the trial had ended in the defendant's absence. 69
In People v. Brooks,70 the court ruled that the lower court
erred in not determining whether the defendant's absence from
court for thirty-seven minutes on the third day of trial was
deliberate. 71 The lower court committed reversible error in
proceeding with the jury charge before making this
determination, as the defendant did not waive his right to be
present.72
The following year, the court decided People v. Velasco,73 in
which it held that neither the defendant's statutory nor
constitutional right to be present was violated when a pre-charge
conference concerning only issues of law and procedure took
present because such prejudice would not have had a substantial relationship to
his opportunity to defend against the charge).
65. 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990).
66. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
67. Id. (citing N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAw § 310.30 (McKinney 1993)).
68. 76 N.Y.2d 119, 556 N.E.2d 141, 556 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1990).
69. Id. at 124, 556 N.E.2d at 143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
70. 75 N.Y.2d 898, 553 N.E.2d 1328, 554 N.Y.S.2d 818, amended by,
76 N.Y.2d 746, 557 N.E.2d 777, 558 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1990).
71. Id. at 899, 553 N.E.2d at 1329, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
72. Id.
73. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
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place in his absence.7 4 The court also held that a side-bar voir
dire dealing with purely judicially-decided juror disqualifications
and a conference in the robing room touching on mere procedural
advisements conducted outside the defendant's presence did not
violate his right to be present.7 5
The New York Court of Appeals, in 1992 decided People v.
Morales.7 6 The court held that a defendant did not have a right to
be present during a competency hearing because the purpose of
the hearing was limited to whether the child-witness understood
the nature of the oath.77
In the 1992 decision, People v. Sloan,7 8 the court of appeals
found that the defendant had a constitutional and statutory right to
be present during side-bar questioning of prospective jurors
regarding their ability to weigh facts presented and testimony
elicited at trial in a dispassionate manner in the face of pre-trial
publicity. 79
Along the same lines, in the 1992 decision of People v.
Antommarchi,80 the court held that the defendant was denied his
statutory and constitutional right to be present, when the judge
questioned prospective jurors about their ability to impartially
hear and objectively weigh evidence at a material stage of the
proceedings. 8 1 Similarly, the court in People v. Dokes,82 held
that defendant's presence was required at Sandoval hearings. 83
In People v. Mitchell,84 the court held that the rule announced
in Antommarchi should be limited to prospective application, 85
74. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
75. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23.
76. 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606 N.E.2d 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992).
77. Id. at 455, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
78. 79 N.Y.2d at 386, 592 N.E.2d 784, 570 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1992).
79. Id. at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 786-87, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 178-79.
80. 80 N.Y.2d 247, 604 N.E.2d 95, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1992).
81. Id. at 250, 604 N.E.2d at*97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
82. 79 N.Y.2d 656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1992).
83. Id. -at 662, 595 N.E.2d at 840, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 765. For an
explanation of Dokes and its progeny of People v. Favor, 82 "N.Y.2d 254, 624
N.E.2d 631, 604 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1993), see infra notes 259-84 and
accompanying text.
84. 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992).
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pursuant to the factors set forth in People v. Pepper.86 The
purpose of conferring on defendants a right to be present on
defendants at voir dire proceedings, where juror biases and
hostilities are examined, is "not to cure any constitutional
infirmity inherent in the former practices, but rather to permit a
defendant a more active role in the eiamination and selection of
potential jurors." 87
Finally, in 1993, People v. Favor88 was handed down by the
New York Court of Appeals. The court held that the Dokes rule,
mandating defendants' right to be present at Sandoval hearings,
should be applied retroactively under a Pepper balancing. 89 The
court reasoned that it should be applied retroactively because the
appellate courts were in disagreement as to whether the defendant
should be present at this stage and whether the burden on the
administration of justice would be minimal. 90
The analyses in these cases, however, were at times, unclear as
to whether the cases were determined based upon the defendant's
constitutional or statutory right to be present. For example, in
People v. Murphy,91 the court prefaced its analysis by stating that
"[a] defendant in a felony case has an absolute constitutional and
statutory right to be present at all stages of the trial .... "92 This
85. Id. at 528, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
86. 53 N.Y.2d 213, 423 N.E.2d 366, 440 N.Y.S.2d 889, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 967 (1981). The Pepper test vas created by the New York Court of
Appeals to determine whether a new holding should be applied retroactively
through an evaluation of the fbllowing factors: "(a) the purpose to be served
by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 220, 423
N.E.2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
87. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 528; 606 N.E.2d 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
88. 82 N.Y.2d 254, 624 N.E.2d 631, 604 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1993).
89. Id. at 265, 624 N.E.2d at 637, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
90. Id. at 265-66, 624 N.E.2d at 638, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
91. 9 N.Y.2d 550, 175 N.E.2d 336, 215 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1961).
92. Id. at 553, 175 N.E.2d at 337, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (citing Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)). In Murphy, the court held that
defendant's New York State constitutional right to be present was abridged
when the jury returned from deliberations fbr additional instructions which led
to a lengthy instruction-related discussion between judge and jury outside the
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analytical distinction is the true crux of this Comment and will be
discussed in Part III.
III. WHETHER THE.RIGHT TO BE PRESENT IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY OR STATUTORILY BASED
A criminal attorney worth her weight will always put forth a
federal and state constitutional argument as well as a statutory
argument (if available) in her client's defense. New York
defendants claiming a violation of their right to be present, can
argue this deprivation by way of a three-pronged attack.
First, the defendant can argue that he was denied his right to be
present under the United States Constitution, because the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Morales,93 adopted the
United States Constitutional "due process" standard as enunciated
in Snyder v. Massachusetts.94 Second, defendant can assert that
his right to be present was infringed under the New York State
Constitution's Due Process Clause. 95 Third, the defendant can
put forth a claim under the New York State codified version of
the right to be present. 96
In Snyder, the Supreme Court held, that "in a prosecution for a
felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness [sic]
of his opportunity to defend against the charge." 97 Such right
extends through the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
presence of the defendant. Id. at 552, 175 N.E.2d at 337, 215 N.Y.S.2d at
754. The court reasoned that defendant's presence was necessary for the
"fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Id. at 553, 175
N.E.2d at 337, 2"15 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
93. 80 N.Y.2d 450, 453-55, 606 N.E.2d 953, 956-57, 591 N.Y.S.2d 821,
828-29 (1992).
94. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Snyder was recently cited with approval in
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). See supra notes 25 and 63
(containing miscellaneous New York holdings adopting the Snyder analysis).
95. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (McKinney 1982). See supra note 53.
96. N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1993). See supra note
22.
97. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06.
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and is bolstered by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.98
Furthermore, even if a defendant is not denied the right to be
present during cross-examination or is not otherwise confronting
witnesses, his defense is made easier if he must be present at the
impaneling of the jury and during summation by counsel. 99 His
presence is mandated because if present, he is able to give advice
to or make suggestions to counsel with respect to matters of
which he has particular knowledge. 100
The Court emphatically concluded, however, that "[n]owhere
in the decisions of this [C]ourt is there a dictum, and still less a
ruling, that the Fourteenth Amendment assures the privilege of
presence when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow." 101 The Due Process Clause only protects a defendant's
right to be present "to the extent that a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." 102
New York has adopted Snyder's due process analysis when
passing on deprivations of the right to be present pigeon-holed in
the Federal and State Constitutions or in Criminal Procedure Law
section 260.20. The fact that the New York Court of Appeals has
adopted Snyder is important when determining whether the right
is constitutionally based in a given proceeding. If the court, in
employing Snyder, determines that a defendant has the right to be
present in a given proceeding, it will be argued in this Comment
that the right in that proceeding is constitutionally based even if
98. Id.
99. Id. at 106. The right to be present, rooted largely in the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause, is also protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses in certain circumstances "when
the defendant is not confronting witnesses or evidence against him." See, e.g.,
United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (1985).
100. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106.
101. Id. at 106-07.
102. Id. at 107-08. The "benefit but a shadow" language is a harmless error
test. The Supreme Court must have foreseen that without such limiting
language, prisoners would seek reversal of their convictions based on their
absence from the most inconsequential of proceedings or from proceedings
where their presence would have been useless to the defense against the
charges. Id. at 106-07.
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the court ultimately confines the right to statute or even if the
defendant claims a violation of his statutory right to be present
only. The significance of whether the right is constitutionally or
statutorily based will be discussed below.
Article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution protects
a defendant's ability to cross-examine and confront witnesses. 103
Section 6 also houses a defendant's right to be present, generally,
through its due process clause, regardless of whether he or she
was deprived of the right to cross-examine or otherwise confront
an adverse witness. 104
The New York State constitutional challenge to the deprivation
of the right, seems to parallel, analytically, the Snyder federal
constitutional challenge. 10 5 So, pursuant to Snyder and article I,
103. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
104. See, e.g., People v. Corley, 67 N.Y.2d 105, 491 N.E.2d 1090, 500
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1986) (affirming conviction where defendant claimed his right
to be present was abridged when he was absent from the sentencing
proceedings). The point in which the defendant rises to be sentenced is clearly
not a point where confrontation would be of use. Rather, defendant has a
general due process right to be present founded upon fundamental fairness; see
also Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107. The Snyder Court stated:
Confusion will result. . . if the privilege of presence be identified with
the privilege of confrontation, which is limited to the stages of the trial
when there are witnesses to be questioned.... [D]efense may be made
easier if the accused is permitted to be present at the examination of
jurors or the summing up of counsel....
Id. at 106-07.
The Supreme Court clearly distinguished between the right to be present for
confrontation purposes and the right to be present as a matter of due process.
The New York Court of Appeals implicitly make this same distinction when
deciding that the right to be present attached at a proceeding having nothing to
do with the right to confront witnesses. See Corley, 67 N.Y.2d at 105, 491
N.B.2d at 1090, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 633; see also People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d
431, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979) (holding New York
constitutional right to be present was violated when the court clerk had ex
parte communication with jury without notifying defendant).
105. See, e.g., People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 604 N.B.2d 95,
590 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1992). In Antommarchi, the defendant claimed he was
denied his constitutional right to be present under both the United States
Constitution's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and under the New York
State Constitution article I, section 6. Id. at 249, 604 N.E.2d at 96, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 34; see also text accompanying Part I and notes 31-61 (tracing the
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section 6, defendants have been held to have a due process right
to be present during: (1) instructions to the jury "where the court
is required to state the fundamental legal principles applicable to
criminal cases generally, as well as the material legal principles
applicable to a particular case and the application of the law to
the facts," 10 6 (2) impaneling the jury,107 (3) receiving
evidence, 108 (4) summations of counsel, 109 (5) receiving the
verdict, 110 and (6) during the "court's instructions in response to
the jury's questions about the evidence." 1 1
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 260.20 protects a
defendant's right to be "present during the trial of an
indictment." 1 12 Therefore, in order to determine whether there
was a statutory deprivation of that right, the court must first
determine whether the defendant was denied that right during a
proceeding that is considered to be part of the "trial," as opposed
to a proceeding merely deemed "ancillary" to the trial.1 13 If a
proceeding or stage is deemed part of the "trial," the statutory
right to be present is considered absolute unless the defendant
right to be present from ancient times to present day; the purposes for the right
are identical for the Federal and the New York State Constitutions).
106. People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 436, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1350, 418
N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (1979).
107. See, e.g., People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 374 N.E.2d 369, 370,
403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (1978); Maurer v. People, 43 N.Y. 1 (1870).
108. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d at 4, 374 N.E.2d at 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 812, 559 N.E.2d 660, 662, 559
N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1990). See, e.g., People v. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759,
505 N.E.2d 610, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1987).
112. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1993).
113. See N.Y. CRiM,. PROC. LAw § 260.20 practice commentary
(McKmney 1993); see also Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d at 4. 374 N.E.2d at 370. 403
N.Y.S.2d at 472 ("Of critical importance to the interpretation of [§ 260.20] is
the meaning of the word 'trial.'"). The court then went on to list the
proceedings that were previously deemed part of the "trial" and ascertained
whether the in-chamber questioning of a juror regarding potential bias was part
of the "trial." Id.
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waives or forfeits the right. 114 Since the right is absolute, it
automatically attaches regardless of whether a defendant's
presence could contribute to the fairness of the proceeding. 115
The statutory right to be present gives greater protection to the
defendant than does the constitutional right because if a
proceeding is deemed part of the "trial," the right is absolute and
the defendant need not prove that his presence is necessary under
Snyder's rigorous "due process" standard. 116
Hence, in 1992, the court of appeals held, in People v.
Morales,117 that "[t]o the extent there is a concern about secret
trials, defendant's presence serves a symbolic function, and thus
the [statutory] right does not rest exclusively on defendant's
potential contribution to the proceedings. Indeed, a defendant's
appearance at rendition of the verdict could serve little practical
function." 118
Stages during which the court of appeals has found the
statutory right to be absolute include the impaneling of the jury,
the introduction of evidence, summations by counsel, the
reception of the verdict, the questioning of jurors regarding their
ability to remain objective, 119 and during Sandoval hearings. 120
On the other hand, there are proceedings where the right to be
present does not attach absolutely. These stages are considered
"ancillary" to the trial and as such, only attach if the defendant
proves that his attendance will contribute to the fairness of the
114. See N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 260.20 practice commentary; see also
infra notes 285-99 and accompanying text (discussing when the statutory or
constitutional right to be present can be waived or forfeited).
115. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 practice commentary. For an
opinion different from the practice commentary, see infra note 121.
116. Id. See People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 526, 606 N.E.2d 1381,
1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (1992) (noting that "although [§ 260.20] has
underlying due process coficerns, its protective scope is broader than the
constitutibnal rights it encompasses") (citations omitted).
117. 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606 N.E.2d 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992).
118. Id. at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
119. See People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 251, 604 N.E.2d 95,
97, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (1992).
120. See People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 662, 595 N.E.2d 836, 840, 584
N.Y.S.2d 761, 765 (1992).
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proceeding. 12 1 In other words, the defendant must meet Snyder's
constitutional standard.
Stages where the defendant was forced to prove that his
attendance would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding
include competency hearings, 122 side-bar conferences dealing
with matters of substantive or procedural law, 12 3 read-back
request colloquies, 124 and side-bar voir dire conferences
concerning jurors' general ability to serve. 12 5
However, just because the New York Court of Appeals has
deemed the right absolute when construing the statute, does not
mean that the right is not constitutionally based, as well. A
defendant might argue that he or she was deprived of the absolute
statutory right to be present instead of the constitutional right,
especially when the statute specifichIly covers a certain
121. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1993) practice
commentary. Professor Preiser believes that the right wil1 attach in an ancillary
proceeding only "upon a showing that the defendant's potential contribution
could have influenced the outcome of the proceeding." Id. (emphasis added).
However, it is analytically questionable whether defendant's contribution must
influence the outcome or just the fairness of the proceeding. To force a
defendant to prove that his presence would have influenced the proceeding's
outcome would burden him with an almost insurmountable obstacle. Id. For
instance, it would be impossible for the defendant to prove that his presence
during summation would influence the "outcome of the proceeding." In the
case of summation, the defendant would have to prove that his presence
influenced the outcome of the trial itself. Of course, the question of whether a
defendant's presence at summation is mandated has already been answered by
§ 260.20 - making a defendant's presence absolute. However, presence at
summation is not absolute because defendant's presence influences the outcome
of the proceeding; the right to be present is absolute because it lends to the
fairness of the trial. Such a conclusion is borne out by thousands of years of
abuses. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 31-61. The purpose of
defendant's presence is "to prevent the ancient evil of secret trials." People v.
Thorn, 156 N.Y. 287, 297, 50 N.E. 947, 951 (1898).
122. See People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606 N.E.2d 953, 591
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992).
123. See People v. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568
N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
124. See People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d
966 (1990).
125. See Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721.
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proceeding. At the same time, some proceedings may only afford
defendant a statutory right to be present. However, the fact that
the right might merely be statutory is of no moment because, the
statute is clearly a codification of those due process concerns and
breaches exhibited in times gone by. 126
Whether the right to be present at a given proceeding is
statutorily or constitutionally based is important only when a
defendant claims the right should be applied retroactively. 127
This is so, because if the right is based only in state statute,
retroactivity questions are governed by the New York State three
part balancing test.128 If, however, the right is grounded in
federal constitutional principles, the hard and fast federal rule
would govern retroactivity issues. 129 With this as a backdrop,
one can explore categorically where the right to be present in
New York State is constitutionally or statutorily based.
In 1990, the New York Court of Appeals held in People v.
Harris,130 that defendant's constitutional and statutory right to be
present was not abridged when, in defendant's absence, the trial
judge went to the door of the jury room and asked for
clarification of a read-back request. 131
The deliberating jury asked "'to hear the testimony about
[complainant] from the second time Judy Flint knock[ed] on the
door until [complainant] arrive[d] at her neighbor's.' 132 The
126. See generally supra notes 31-61 and accompanying text; see New York
v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 348, 334 N.E.2d 566, 570, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610
(1975).
127. See People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 525, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1384,
591 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (1992) (holding that "[jif no Federal Constitutional
principles are involved... the question of retroactivity is one of State law").
128. Id. at 525-26, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 993. In New
York, the court determines "the retroactive effect of a new rule by evaluating
three factors: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of
reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the new administration of justice
of retroactive application." Id.
129. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that the new
constitutional rules shall be applied retroactively on all pending direct review
cases).
130. 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990).
131. Id. at 811, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
132. d.
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judge brought both the prosecutor and defense counsel into the
jury room to make sure that the jurors wanted to hear the
testimony of the victim [complainant] and not the testimony of
another witness. 133 Although this conversation with the jury in
defendant's absence was not transcribed, the judge promptly put
the communication on the record when he brought the defendant
and jury back into the courtroom to respond to the request. 134
The court held that section 310.30 of the Criminal Procedure
Law1 35 was not violated because the jury was given no
"information or instruction" within the meaning of the statute. 136
In other words, no "information or instruction was imparted"
because the judge was merely trying to understand which
testimony the jury wanted read back - testimony about the victim
from other witnesses or testimonyfron the victim, herself. 137
Since this communication was not "information or
instructions," the defendant's right to be present was not absolute
and the inquiry defaulted to the Snyder "due process"
analysis. 138
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. N.Y. CR]I. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 1993). Section 310.30
provides:
At anytime during its deliberation, the jury may request the court for
further instruction or information with respect to the law, with respect
to the content or substance of any trial evidence, or with respect to any
other matter pertinent to the jury's consideration of the case. Upon such
a request, the court must direct that the jury be returned to the
courtroom and, after notice to both the people and counsel for the
defendant, and in the presence of the defendant, must give such
requested information or instruction as the court deems proper. With the
consent of the parties and upon the request of the jury for further
instruction with respect to a statute, the court may also give to the jury
copies of the text of any statute which, in its discretion, the court deems
proper.
Id.
136. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
137. Id.
138. Id. Pursuant to Snyder, a criminal defendant "has the privilege under
the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness [sic] of his
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Finding that this communication was only "ministerial" in
nature, the court reasoned that Harris' constitutional rights were
not abridged because the "communication was wholly unrelated
to the substantive legal or factual issues of the trial[" such that
his presence could have borne any relation to his opportunity to
defend against the charge.139 Therefore, defendant had no
constitutional or statutory right to be present when the trial judge
clarified a read-back request. 140
The only dissenter, Judge Titone, stated that the trial judge's
clarification of the read-back request was more than a ministerial
act because he had to employ a "high degree of judicial
sensitivity and knowledge" so as not to "make remarks which
might convey potentially prejudicial material." 141
Judge Titone further found that the majority's distinction
between giving "information or instructions" and the mere
clarification of a jury's request to be unworkable because it
"makes the determination as to whether the defendant's presence
is required turn upon the court's prescience as to what might, or
might not, have to be said to the jurors in order to obtain the
needed clarification." 142
Judge Titone concluded that defendant's .presence would have
contributed to the fairness of the proceeding because, having
heard the testimony and witnessed the jurors' responses, he may
have found intricacies in the read-back request that the judge
missed, and therefore could have made suggestions to narrow the
inquiry. 143
The Harris court chipped away at defendants' right to be
present. According to Criminal Procedure Law section
opportunity to defend against the charge." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105-06 (1934).
139. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 663, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 814, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 815, 559 N.E.2d at 664, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 970 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
143. Id. at 814, 559 N.E.2d at 663, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
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310.30,144 the defendant must be present when the judge
complies with the deliberating jury's request for further
information or instruction. In Harris, this statute was violated on
its face. The jury asked for more information and the judge gave
it in defendant's absence. It was not for the court to determine
what constituted "information or instructions" because the
Legislature had already mandated defendant's presence when any
information or instruction request by the jury was complied with
by the judge. The court transformed the "information or
instruction" language into a factual question in order to limit the
purview of the statutory right. The court, sua sponte, defaulted a
statutorily-established core proceeding - i.e., a judge's
compliance with a jury's request for further information or
instruction - to an ancillary proceeding such that defendant's
presence would only be necessary if Syder was met. In so doing,
the right to be present during the giving of jury instructions was
stripped of its constitutional protection, relegated to statutory
protection, and ultimately divested of that as well.
Regardless of whether one finds Judge Titone's dissent and the
above position persuasive, Harris is probably an aberration
because the right to be present at the giving of jury instructions,
is generally constitutionally and statutorily imbedded in New
York.145
In the 1991 case of People v. Velasco,14 6 the New York Court
of Appeals held that neither defendant's statutory nor
constitutional right to be present was violated when a pre-charge
conference, a side-bar voir dire, and a conference in the robing
room took place in his absence. 147
The court found that defendant's statutory right to be present
"during the trial of an indictment" attached during the
"impaneling of the jury, the introduction of evidence, the
144. See N.Y. CalM. PROC. LAw § 310.30.
145. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 815, 559 N.E.2d at 664, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 970
(Titone, J., dissenting). See, e.g., People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431 (1979).
146. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.B.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
147. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23.
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summations of counsel, and the court's charge to the jury. '' 148
Defendant's New York State constitutional right required his
presence at trial "'to the extent that a fair and just hearing would
be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." 149 The
court then held that neither the statutory nor the constitutional
right to be present applied at the pre-charge conference. 150 The
conference was attended by prosecution and defense counsel and
dealt with a stipulation regarding the contents of a medical
record, the scheduling of the rest of the trial, and the content of
the jury instructions. 151 As such, the conference only involved
questions of law or procedure and defendant failed to show that if
present, his potential contribution could have influenced the
outcome of the proceeding. 152
The court then found that the defendant's presence was not
required at the side-bar voir dire for similar reasons. 153 In open
court before the defendant, the judge asked prospective jurors
general questions dealing with their ability to serve including
physical impairments, family obligations, and work
commitments. 154 If a juror wanted to answer specific questions,
the judge directed him or her to approach the bench for further
discussi6n outside the hearing of defendant and the venire. 155
The court concluded that defendant's presence during the bench
discussions would have been "'useless, or the benefit but a
shadow" 156 because the "determination that a prospective juror
was disqualified before voir dire was a matter for the court and
defendant had no constitutional or statutory right to personally
participate in the discussions leading to the court's ruling." 157
148. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (citing People v.
Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 369, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1978)).
149. Id. (adopting Snyderv. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23.
154. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23 (quoting
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07).
157. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
[Vol 11
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 11 [2020], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/7
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that his right to be
present during impaneling of the jury was violated when he was
absent from the robing room where the prosecution and defense
counsel offered their legal grounds for their challenges for cause
and peremptory challenges. 158 The court found this argument
unavailing because defendant had the opportunity to consult with
counsel before the challenges were made, he was present during
the actual voir dire when these challenges were effectuated in
open court, and the robing room discussion "was a mere
preliminary advisement of the court" instead of a material part of
the trial. 159 Thus, defendant had neither a constitutional nor
statutory right to be present at a pre-charge conference dealing
with purely procedural questions, at side-bar voir dire of
prospective jurors relating only to grounds for juror
disqualification by the court, or at a robing room conference
centering around the legal bases for challenges of jurors.
The court denied defendant his right to be present in the above
situations because he could have contributed very little to the
fairness of the proceedings. The pre-charge and robing-room
conferences dealt only with discussions of arcane legal principles,
clearly outside of defendant's knowledge. 160 Furthermore, the
defendant's ability to observe the jurors' demeanor would have
been useless to the proceeding because the jurors who approached
only spoke to the judge about physical impairments, familial
obligations, and work commitments - things that they would not
lie about and things far removed from the issues at trial.
The court of appeals probably believed, as a matter of policy,
that it would impose a hardship on the state, and a windfall to the
defendant, to escape guilt, based on a statute whose purpose
stems from past abuses which are absent from current judicial
proceedings. 161
In the 1992 case of People v. Morales,162 the court found that
the defendant did not have a right to be present during a
158. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-27.
161. See Goldin, supra note 32, at 23 n.23, 24.
162. 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606 N.E.2d 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992).
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competency hearing. 163 The trial judge in Morales, excluded
defendant from a competency hearing so as not to distract the
child-witness who was allegedly raped by the defendant. The
hearing's purpose was limited to whether the child understood the
nature of the oath. 164 However, when the trial judge asked the
witness why she was in court, she answered "'[b]ecause [the
defendant]... did fresh things to me.' 165
The court struck down the defendant's claim that such an
answer was the taking or eliciting of substantive testimony so as
to make the hearing a material part of the trial. 166 The court
reasoned that this "brief statement -- which was not in response
to a question designed to elicit substantive testimony -- could
[not] have borne a 'substantial relationship' to the opportunity to
defend at trial." 167
Additionally, the court concluded that if defendant had special
knowledge about the child-witness' testimonial capacity, which
could have had a bearing on the fairness of the hearing, he could
have informed defense counsel, who could have raised these
issues during the hearing or during cross-examination. 168 Thus,
defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to be
present when the trial court examined a child-witness to
determine whether she was competent to testify.
Interestingly, the court of appeals found that the 1987 United
States Supreme Court case of Kentucky v. Stincer,169 was
163. Id.
164. Id. at 451, 606 N.E.2d at 954, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 826. This hearing was
mandated under Criminal Procedure Law § 60.20(2) because the witness was
only nine years old. Section 60.20 provides in relevant part that "[a) child less
than twelve years old may not testify under oath unless the court is satisfied
that lie understands the nature of an oath." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(2)
(McKinney 1994).
165. 80 N.Y.2d at 452, 606 N.E.2d at 954, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
166. Id. at 454, 606 N.E.2d at 956, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 828 (citation
omitted).
167. Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 746 (1987)).
168. Id. at 455, 606 N.E.2d at 956, 591 N.Y.S.2d. at 828.
169. 482 U.S. 730 (1987). The facts in Stincer were identical to Morales
except that two witnesses instead of one were examined in camera to determine
their competency. Id. at 732. The Court held that defendant's due process
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dispositive of defendant's federal claims. The Snyder-Stincer
analysis was not applied by the court to resolve defendant's state
constitutional claims which were never discussed. The court's
discussion of defendant's right to be present under New York law
at competency hearings was limited to whether Criminal
Procedure Law section 260.20 applied. 170 Pursuant to a Criminal
Procedure Law section 260.20 analysis, a competency hearing
was not a core part of the trial because trial issues were not
broached at this stage, the hearing could take place pretrial, and
the only purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the
child-witness understood the difference between the truth and a
lie. 171
Thus, a competency hearing was deemed an "ancillary"
proceeding at which defendant had little if anything to offer to its
fairness. 17 2 Therefore, a defendant's right t6 be present at
competency hearings is statutorily based and only protected if
defendant can show that he knew particular information about the
child-witness' truthfulness that would assist the judge or his
counsel in arriving at a fair competency determination. 17 3 Given
the fact that cross-examination may reveal errors made during the
hearing, and that courts are generally reluctant to apply the right
in this context, defendants have no right to be present at
competency hearings.
The 1990 case of People v. CaiN174 presented the issue of
whether the defendant had a right to be present when post-
verdict, supplemental instructions were given to a single juror. 175
rights were not violated by his absence because questioning was limited to
whether each witness understood the nature of the oath and no substantive
testimony was given by the girls. Id. at 745-46. Further, defendant's presence
would not have ensured the reliability of the determination because no
evidence was presented to show defendant knew certain background facts about
the children such that he could assist the judge in asking more focused
questions about their ability to understand the oath. Id. at 747.
170. Morales, 8.0 N.Y.2d at 455, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
171. Id. at 453, 606 N.E.2d at 955, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
172. Id. at 457, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
173. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747.
174. 76 N.Y.2d 119, 556 N.E.2d 141, 556 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1990).
175. Id. at 119, 556 N.E.2d at 142, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
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Upon the rendition of the verdict, juror number seven
equivocated when he was polled by defense counsel and then
asked to speak with the trial judge in private. 176 After in camera
discussions, all jurors, including juror number seven responded
affirmatively to the clerk's question, "[i]s this your verdict?" 177
The judge then sent the entire jury back to the jury room so the
judge could examine written questions tendered by juror number
seven. 178 The judge found the questions unintelligible and the
prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that the juror did not
understand the theory of "acting in concert." 179
While in chambers with juror number seven, and in defendant's
absence, the judge repeated the initial jury instructions,
examples, and discussed some of the juror's specific factual
findings. 180 The judge clarified the juror's confusion and
thereafter accepted the jury's verdict as recorded over defense
counsel's objection based on an inability to question the juror at
the colloquy. 181
The court found that defendant's statutory right to be present
was violated because the trial had not ended as a matter of law,
and jury instructions were given in his absence. 182 As such,
defendant's presence was absolutely mandated, because the
supplemental jury instructions had been deemed a material part of
the trial. 183
Defendant's constitutional right was abridged when
supplemental instructions were given, post-verdict, after the jury
was polled. 184 The instruction might have been dispositive of the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 123, 556 N.E.2d at 142, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
180. Id. at 123, 556 N.E.2d at 143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
181. Id. at 124, 556 N.E.2d at 143-44, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850-51.
182. Id.
183. People v. Mebmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759, 505 N.E.2d 610, 513 N.Y.S.2d
100 (1987) (giving, in accused's absence, answers to jury questions violates
defendant's right to be present at a material part of the trial); People v.
Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 376 N.E.2d 369, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1978) (impaneling
the jury is deemed a material part of the trial requiring defendant's presence).
184. Cain, 76 N.Y.2d at 122-23, 556 N.E.2d at 142, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
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outcome of the case because they were given in response to
questions particularly chosen and asked by one of the jurors. 185
While in chambers, juror number seven demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the legal principles involved, and he received an
explanation of mental culpability. 186 The juror attempted to
speak about factual conclusions and the substance of the jury's
deliberations, but was cut short by the judge. 187 This
information, dealt directly with defendant's guilt. Not only could
defendant have observed juror number seven's demeanor, but he
could have also observed defense counsel's reaction when the
judge attended and entertained an objectionable colloquy.
Consequently, as a matter of fairness, defendant's presence was
mandated. Therefore, defendant's right to be present when the
jury or juror is charged or given additional instructions is
statutorily and constitutionally based.
Another material stage of the trial in which the defendant's
presence is required is the voir dire. In the 1992 case, People v.
Sloan,188 the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether a defendant had a right to be present during questioning
relating to jurors' reactions to pretrial publicity concerning the
crime at issue and their feelings about the prosecution's key
witness, a famous television newscaster. 189
While in the process of robbing the Racing Club Restaurant in
New York City, the defendant was challenged by John Roland, a
local television personality, who attempted to disarm him. 190
During the struggle, Roland was struck in the head with the pistol
and was declared a city hero based on his courage in the face of
danger. 191
Before formal voir dire and in defendant's absence, the trial
judge questioned each of the ninety venire-persons as to how the
185. Id. at 123-24, 556 N.E.2d at 143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850 (citing People
v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 391 N.E.2d 137, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979)).
186. Id. at 122-23, 556 N.E.2d at 142, 556 N.Y.S.2d at, 849.
187. Id. at 123, 556 N.E.2d at 142, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
188. 79 N.Y.2d 386, 592 N.E.2d 784, 583 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1992).
189. Id. at 390, 592 N.E.2d at 785, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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extensive pretrial publicity, especially that covering Roland,
would affect their ability to issue a fair verdict. 192
While the questions posed by the trial judge to prospective
jurors in Velasco only dealt with qualifications of jurors in the
general sense, 193 the questioning in Sloan delved into jurors'
personal feelings and attitudes toward individuals who would play
a major role in that very case. 194 The court found that the
defendant's presence during such questioning could have a
"substantial effect on [his] ability to defend against the
charges."'195 Defendant's presence would enable hin to observe
the demeanor, biases, and hostilities of prospective jurors,
thereby enabling defense counsel to exercise challenges for cause
and peremptory challenges wisely. 196 Thus, the court found that
defendant's presence was constitutionally mandated. 197
Further, the court stated that the defendant had a statutory right
to be present because Criminal Procedure Law, section 260.20,
requires his presence during the impaneling of the jury. 198
Therefore, the court held that defendant had a constitutional
and statutory right to be present during side-bar questioning of
prospective jurors regarding their ability to weigh the facts
presented and testimony elicited at trial in a dispassionate manner
in the face of pre-trial publicity. 199
However, the court did not discuss, in detail, defendant's
statutory right to be present during the questioning of prospective
jurors,200 but instead, assumed the right to be absolute, and
focused on his constitutional right to be present. Clearly, the
192. Id. at 390-91, 592 N.E.2d at 785-86, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 146-61.
194. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 786-87, 583 N.Y.S.2d at
178-79.
195. Id. at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 786, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
196. Id. at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 787, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
197. Id. at 393, 592 N.E:2d at 787, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
198. Id. at 391, 592 N.E.2d at 786, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 178. See People v.
Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 374 N.E.2d 369, 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472
(1978) (impaneling ofjury is an important trial proceeding making defendant's
presence essential).
199. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d at 393, 592 N.E.2d at 787, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
200. Id. at 391-92, 592 N.E.2d at 786, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
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court was interested in distinguishing the non-existent right in
Velasco201 from the federal and New York constitutionally based
right in the instant matter.
In 1992, the New York Court of Appeals held in People v.
Antommarchi,202 that the defendant was denied ilis statutory and
constitutional right to be present during a material stage of the
proceedings when the judge questioned prospective jurors about
their ability to weigh evidence objectively and to hear testimony
impartially in defendant's absence.203
In Antommarchi, the defendant was present when the court
began to question prospective jurors from a questionnaire but was
not present when several jurors were invited to approach the
bench and speak with the judge about private biases. 204 The
discussions dealt with (1) whether certain jurors could assess the
evidence dispassionately in light of the fact they had, themselves,
been victims of crimes, (2) whether defendant was guilty merely
because he had been charged with a crime, and (3) whether at
least one juror could impartially analyze the testimony of police
officers in spite of her numerous friendships with other
officers. 205
The court held that if the defendant was present he could have
assisted in assessing the juror's "'facial expressions, demeanor
and other subliminal responses"' 206 and therefore reversed his
conviction even though defense counsel failed to object when
defendant was excluded from the side-bar discussions. 207 Thus,
the court held that defendant's presence was constitutionally
mandated.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 146-61.
202. 80 N.Y.2d 247, 604 N.E.2d 95, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1992).
203. Id. at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
204. Id. at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 96-97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 34-35.
205. Id. at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
206. Id. (quoting Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d at 392, 592 N.E.2d. at 787, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 179).
207. Id. See People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 584
N.Y.S.2d 761 (1992) (holding that the fundamental nature of the right to be
present allows defendant to raise a deprivation claim even though defense
counsel made no objection during trial).
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Furthermore, defendant, Antommarchi, had a statutory right to
be present under Sloan, because the questioning of prospective
jurors was a material part of the trial. 20 8 Interestingly, Sloan had
been decided six months earlier and had vindicated defendant's
right to be present on nearly identical facts, yet the Appellate
Division, First Department, which decided Sloan, still affirmed
defendant's conviction in Antommarchi.
In the 1992 case of People v. Mitchell,2 09 the New York Court
of Appeals was faced with the task of deciding whether the right
to be present at side-bar voir dire proceedings concerning
potential biases and other sensitive matters, should be applied
retroactively or prospectively only. 2 10 The court held that the
rule announced in Antommarchi should be limited to prospective
application pursuant to the test developed in People v. Pepper.2 11
In deciding that Pepper would apply, the court rejected the
competing view elucidated in Griffith v. Kentucky. 2 12 In Griffith,
the United States Supreme Court held that "a new [federal]
constitutional rule is to be applied retroactively to all cases
pending on direct review."213
The Mitchell court turned Antommarchi on its head and ruled
that defendants' right to be present at the questioning of
prospective jurors was only statutorily-based.2 14 Even though
Sloan and Antommarchi both focused on defendant's
constitutional right to be present and down-played the attendant
statutory right, the court found that the statute's purview was
208. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d at 250, 604 N.B.2d at 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
35.
209. 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992).
210. Id. at 524, 606 N.E.2d at 1383, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
211. 53 N.Y.2d 213, 423 N.E.2d 366, 440 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1981). The
Pepper test enables courts to determine whether new rules should be applied
retroactively through an evaluation of the following factors: "(1) the purpose
to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3)
the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application." Mitchell,
80 N.Y.2d at 525-26, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
212. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
213. Id. at 322-23.
214. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 526-27, 606 N.E.2d at 1384-85, 591
N.Y.S.2d at 993-94.
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broader than both *the Federal and New York State
Constitutions. 215
Further, and more important, the court reasoned that the
Antommarchi court's analysis proceeded in a general rather than
fact-specific manner. 216 It involved none of the balancing process
employed in constitutional determinations, but rather was based
on a violation of Criminal Procedure Law section 260.20.217 The
Antommarchi court "did not evaluate the facts in light of the
entire record nor did [it] make a determination that defendant's
ability to defend against the charges had been substantially
impaired. "218
Moreover, even if a constitutional analysis were employed in
Antommarchi, the court explained, the right to be present at side-
bar conferences is not constitutionally required because
"exclusion from [side-bar conferences], which are not
constitutionally required, would not substantially affect the ability
to defend against the charge" and therefore, "defendant's
presence is not essential to a fair trial. "219
Because the Antommarchi rule was not based on federal
constitutional law, the court was free to apply New York's rule
retroactively. 220 Under the New York Pepper test, the first
inquiry deals with the purpose of the new rule.221 The court
decided that the purpose of conferring on a defendant a right to
be present at voir dire proceedings where jurors' biases and
hostilities are examined, is "not to cure any constitutional
infirmity inherent in the former practices, but rather to permit a
defendant a more active role in the examination and selection of
potential jurors." 222
215. Id.
216. Id. at 527, 606 N.E.2d at 1385, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 994
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 498 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
220. Id.
221. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d at 220, 423 N.E.2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
222. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 528, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
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Under the second prong, the court ruled that Antommarchi
should be applied prospectively because courts have relied
significantly on the previous practice of examining prospective
jurors without the defendant being present in order to speed up
jury selection, prevent jurors from being embarrassed, and to
promote juror openness. 223 Third, the court found that the
prospective application was necessary because a different
application would delay countless pending depositions, which
would substantially interfere with the dispensation of justice.224
The court found retroactive application unnecessary since no rule
required defendants' presence nor called for automatic reversal in
his absence, when potential jurors were asked about their biases
and hostilities prior to the 1992 Antommarchi decision. 225
Therefore, defendant has only a statutory right to be present at
side-bar voir dire proceedings dealing with jurors' biases and
hostilities and this right will only be applied prospectively. 226
This decision is analytically flawed. First, the rule as
announced in Antommarchi is clearly constitutionally based. In
Antommarchi, the court made more of defendant's due process
right to be present than of his statutory right to be present. 227
More importantly, Antommarchi relied heavily on Sloan, which
explicitly held that defendant had a constitutional right to be
present at side-bar voir dire proceedings dealing with juror
hostilities and biases. 228 As was discussed above, the court in
Sloan distinguished Velasco229 from the case before it and
focused on the fact that the right was constitutionally based:
223. Id.
224. Id. at 529, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 250, 604 N.E.2d 95, 97,
590 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (1992). The court mentioned the statutory right
parenthetically, while elaborating on the constitutional right in a whole
paragraph. Id.
228. Id. (citing People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 386, 392, 592 N.B.2d
784,787, 583 N.Y.S.2d 176, 179 (1992)).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 188-201.
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[D]efendants' presence [at the side-bar voir dire] ... could have
had a substantial effect on their ability to defend against the
charges... [because the questioning] delved into attitudes and
feelings concerning some of the'events and witnesses involved in
the very case to be heard .... Defendants' presence at the
questioning on such matters and the resultant opportunity for
them to assess the jurors' facial expressions, deneanor and
other subliminal responses as well as the manner and tone of
their verbal replies so as to detect any indication of bias or
hostility, could have been critical in making proper
determinations in the important and sensitive matters.2 30
Antommarchi was decided on the same constitutional due
process grounds as was demonstrated by the explicit reference to
and the quotation of Sloan's due process analysis language:
"[D]efendants are entitled to hear questions intended to search
out a prospective juror's bias, hostility or predisposition to
believe or discredit the testimony of potential witnesses and the
venire person's answers so that they have the opportunity to
assess the juror's 'facial expressions, demeanor and other
subliminal responses. "'231
Further, the Antommarchi court neither had to "evaluate the
facts in light of the entire record nor... make a determination
that defendant's ability to defend against the charges had been
substantially impaired ' 232 because Sloan was factually and
legally on all fours with Antommarchi. It seems as though the
court in Antommarchi decided that it was unnecessary to again set
forth an entire constitutional due process analysis for the same
factual situation because Sloan was decided only six months
earlier.2 33 In other words, it seems as though the court felt the
230. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 786-87, 583 N.Y.S.2d 178-
79 (emphasis added).
231. Antonunarchi, 80 N.Y.2d at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
35 (quoting Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 787, 583 N.Y.S.2d at
179) (emphasis added).
232. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 527, 606 N.E.2d at 1385, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
994.
233. Sloan dealt with the questioning of prospective jurors about their
ability to weigh impartially the testimony of a widely known news reporter. 79
N.Y.2d at 390, 592 N.E.2d at 785, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 177. Antommnarchi dealt
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right to be present at voir dire proceedings was so obviously
rooted in the constitution that the unanimous court found it
useless and the benefit but a shadow to rehash what had been
deemed a foregone conclusion in the previous term.
The Mitchell court also cited to United States v. Washington234
where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the defendant had a statutory right to be
present during a bench portion of voir dire.235 The Mitchell court
relied on Washington when it stated that "[a]lthough presence at
side-bar conferences would enable defendant to glean information
from jurors' responses and demeanor essential to the exercise of
peremptory challenges, exclusion from those proceedings, which
are not constitutionally required, would not substantially affect
the ability to defend against the charge." 236
What did New York's Court of Appeals mean? Did it mean
that defendant's presence was not required because the ability to
exercise peremptory challenges was not based in the Federal
Constitution? Or did it mean that defendant's presence was not
required because the right to be present during the exercise of
peremptory challenges was not based in the Federal
Constitution?237
with the questioning of prospective jurors regarding their ability to objectively
consider the testimony of police officers. 80 N.Y.2d at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 97,
590 N.Y.S.2d at 35. This factual distinction is irrelevant when the real issue in
both cases is whether defendant's presence was constitutionally required when
jurors' biases were examined. In each case and in any case the court or counsel
examines jurors' biases and hostilities. Defendants must be present during
juror questioning regardless of whether the biases stem from police officers or
from reporters. As such, it was unnecessary, in Antommarchi, to factually
analyze whether jurors would be able or unable to objectively weigh testimony
from police officers as compared to testimony from reporters.
234. 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
235. Id. at 497.
236. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 527, 606 N.E.2d at 1385, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
994 (emphasis added).
237. See People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 436, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1349,
418 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (1979); People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 374
N.B.2d 369, 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (1978); Maurer v. People, 43 N.Y.
1, 3 (1870).
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It matters not, because the Federal Constitution, as construed
under Snyder and its New York progeny, does not distinguish
between peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. Both
are subsumed within the proceeding entitled "impaneling of the
jury." 238 Thus, the defendant's presence is constitutionally
mandated because his contribution could lend to the fairness of
the proceeding. 239 While United States v. Washington is not the
constitutional baseline in New York, Snyder is.
Finally, Mitchell introduces the counterintuitive notion that a
right can be fundamental and statutory, simultaneously. 240
Clearly, the "defendant's right to be present is considered to be a
fundamental right." 241 Since this right is fundamental, a
defendant's claim is preserved for appeal even in the absence of
an objection.242 In Mitchell, the right to be present was relegated
to statutory protection, the violation nevertheless merited reversal
without regard to whether an objection was made.243
However, in New York State, when a defendant falls to object
to a violation of a statutory right, that right is waived and
therefore is not preserved for appeal. 24 4 So, for instance, when a
defendant fails to object to a prosecutor's non-compliance with
the New York speedy trial statute, defendant effectively waives
238. See Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d at 436, 391 N.E.2d at 1349, 418 N.Y.S.2d at
373; Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d at 4. 374 N.E.2d at 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 472;
Maurer, 43 N.Y. at 3.
239. See Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d at 4, 374 N.E.2d at 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d at
472; Maurer, 43 N.Y. at 3.
240. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 526-27, 606 N.E.2d at 1384-85. 591
N.Y.S.2d at 993-94.
241. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 practice commentary (McKinney
1993) (citing People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 454
N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982)).
242. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d at 520, 604 N.E.2d at 1397, 590 N.Y.S.2d
at 35 (citation omitted).
243. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 527, 606 N.E.2d at 1385, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
994.
244. See, e.g., People v. Suarez, 55 N.Y.2d 940, 43 N.E.2d 245. 49
N.Y.S.2d 176 (1982).
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his statutory speedy trial right when he pleads guilty. 24 5
Conversely, a claim of a tonstitutional violation need not be
raised *during trial and will still be preserved for appellate
review. 24 6
Since it is unlikely that Dokes or Mitchell will be overturned,
the court has created an analytical aberration -- a "constatutory"
right. This right is firmly rooted in the constitution, yet
arbitrarily found to be statutorily-based so that courts can achieve
three purposes: (1) prevent time consuming and burdensome
retroactivity litigation, (2) phase out the use of a right whose
purpose is. thought to be lacking in today's judicial
proceedings, 247 and (3) interpret the State Constitution without
federal intervention.248
By deeming the right to be present as statutory in the context of
voir dire proceedings, the court has prevented a myriad of
criminal appeals. As mentioned above, if a right is not rooted in
the Federal Constitution, questions of retroactivity will be
245. See id. at 941, 434 N.E.2d at 245, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 176; see also
People v. Dodson, 48 N.Y.2d 36, 39, 396 N.E.2d 194, 195, 421 N.Y.S.2d
47, 48 (1979) (citation omitted).
246. See People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152, 159 n.7, 411 N.E.2d 563, 566
n.7, 455 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256 n.7 (1982) (holding a claim based on New York
constitutional speedy trial right is not waived even if the delay occurred before
the onset of criminal proceedings); see also People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1,
7, 394 N.E.2d 1134,1137, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (1979) (concluding claim
of constitutional double jeopardy is preserved, indefinitely, for appellate
review).
247. See supra text accompanying note 89; see also supra text
accompanying note 37.
248. Case law in this area demonstrates that the Federal and New York
State Constitutions' due process clauses parallel each other. For example,
when a defendant argued that his due process rights under Snyder were
violated, the New York Court of Appeals parenthetically cited to article I,
section 6 of the New York Constitution. See, e.g., Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d at 436,
391 N.E.2d at 1349, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 373. As such, in order to escape federal
constitutional tenets, the court has, and will gradually continue to confine
aspects of the right to be present to statute even though the right stemmed from
due process concerns. While in statutory form, the court and the legislature
have more power to control the scope of the right without federal
constitutional cases indirectly enlarging its purview in New York.
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decided under New York's Pepper test.249 Under the third
factor, the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive
application, would be burdensome to say the least. Since "the
voir dire process is involved in every jury trial [then] most if not
all of the judgments of conviction in the cases currently on appeal
[would] present an Antominarchi question." 250 Courts would be
required to hold hearings to "reconstruct a record of
conversations and questions, which, at the time, none of the
participants objected to or deemed of particular significance.
Conceivably, new trials would be required in all of the substantial
number of cases in which no record of the voir dire was
made." 251
Mitchell conserved precious judicial resources, but was this a
bootstrapping argument? Under the first prong of the Pepper test,
the court found the "purpose of the rule [was] not to cur6 any
constitutional infirmity inherent in former practices.... "252
However, Antomnzrchi, backed by Sloan, did cure a
constitutional infirmity. Defendants are now allowed to be
present while jurors are questioned about their biases and
hostilities.253 The constitution requires the defendant's presence
because it contributes to the fairness of the proceeding. 254 It
makes no difference that defendants are no longer tried by.
walking on hot plowshares. 255 Presently, it has been deemed an
unconstitutional abuse to question jurors about their ability to be
impartial in the defendant's absence. As construed, the
249. See supra notes 86 and 211 and accompanying text.
250. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 529, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
995.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 528, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
253. See Antommardzi, 80 N.Y.2d at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 97, 540
N.Y.S.2d at 35.
254. Id. See Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d at 392, 592 N.E.2d at 786-87, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 178-79. In Sloan, the court stated that defendant's presence while
jurors are questioned is "critical in making proper determinations in the
important and sensitive matters relating to challenges for cause and
peremptories." Id.
255. See supra note 33.
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constitution never before prohibited defendant's exclusion from
voir dire. Such exclusion was the constitutional infirmity.
Under the second prong of the Pepper test, the Mitchell court
held that courts have "substantially relied on the prior
practice... [of] examin[ing] prospective jurors in defendants'
absence." 256 However, the Mitchell court noted that some courts
will allow a defendant to attend the bench voir dire if he formally
protests exclusion.257 Therefore, there was not substantial
reliance on the former practice -- some judges permitted a
defendant's presence while others excluded him. It appears that
Antommarchi vested in defendant, a mere statutory right to be
present at side-bar voir dire in order to apply Pepper. Under
Pepper, the right was found to apply prospectively, only for the
purpose of expediting the administration of justice.258
Finally, in the 1993 case of People v. Favor,259 the court of
appeals wrestled with the issue of whether a defendant's right to
be present at a Sandoval hearing260  should be applied
retroactively or prospectively. 261 In People v. Dokes,262 the
court found that the right to be present extended to Sandoval
hearings as long as defendant's presence would not be
"superfluous. ' 263 Further, defendant did not need to raise an
objection of denial of his right to be present in order to preserve
the record for appeal. 264
in the Favor case, defendant was absent from an in camera
conference held to determine whether he would be subject to
256. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 528, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
995.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 82 N.Y.2d 254, 624 N.E.2d 631, 604 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1993).
260. See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974) (holding that a trial judge may, in his discretion, make
an advance ruling as to the prosecutor's use of prior criminal convictions or
prior immoral acts in order to impeach the defendant witness' credibility).
261. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 258-59, 624 N.E.2d at 633, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
496.
262. 79 N.Y.2d 656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1992).
263. Id. at 662, 595 N.E.2d at 840, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
264. Id.
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cross-examination for his prior convictions and bad acts in the
event he chose to testify.265 The court found this exclusion to be
a clear violation of the Dokes rule because defendant was denied
the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the colloquy, the
results of which were not wholly favorable to him. 26 6
Before deciding whether defendant's right to be present was
violated, the court first had to determine whether Dokes would
apply prospectively or retroactively. 267 Rejecting defendant's
argument that his right to be present at the Sandoval hearing was
rooted in the United States Constitution, the court applied the
Pepper test2 68 to determine whether a "new rule of state law
need not automatically be applied to all cases currently in the
direct appellate pipeline." 269 Even though Dokes referred to due
process notions, the court found that Dokes was ultimately
decided under Criminal Procedure Law section 260.20.270
Contrary to what the court said in Favor, Dokes unquestionably
was a due process decision. The Dokes court did not speak to the
right applying, absolutely, regardless of the contribution that
defendant could offer to the proceeding. 271 Conversely, the
entire Dokes decision speaks of the necessity of defendant's
presence, noting, for instance, "'defendant alone may be able to
inform his attorney of inconsistencies, errors and falsities in the
testimony of the officers or other witnesses.' 272 The court
emphatically concluded that a "key factor" in determining
265. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 259, 624 N.E.2d at 633, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
266. Id. at 267, 624 N.E.2d at 639, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
267. Id. at 262, 624 N.E.2d at 636, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
268. Id. at 262, 624 N.E.2d at 635-36, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 498-99. See supra
notes 86 and 211 for the three prong Pepper test.
269. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 262, 624 N.E.2d at 635, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 498
(citing People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d
990 (1992)).
270. Id. (citing People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 659, 595 N.E.2d 836,
838, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (1992)). See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20
(McKinney 1993) (conferring on defendants a right to be "personally present
during the trial of an indictment....").
271. See N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW11 § 260.20 practice commentary
(McKinney 1993).
272. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d at 659, 595 N.E.2d at 838, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
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whether a defendant has a right to be present during a particular
proceeding was "whether the proceeding involved factual matters
about which defendant might have peculiar knowledge that would
be useful in advancing the defendant's or countering the People's
position."' 273 This is the Snyder analysis - defendant's
knowledge could help him defend against the charges by
advancing his position.274
Applying Snyder to the facts in Dokes, the court concluded that
"[tihe [trial] court's ruling on the permissible scope of cross-
examination about [defendant's seven prior charges could be] the
pivotal factor in the defendant's determination whether to
testify.... [So] it cannot be said on this record that defendant's
presence 'would have been useless, or the benefit of a
shadow."275 The only mention of the statute comes at the very
end - "since the contention concerns the right conferred by CPL
260, defendant's failure to object is not fatal to his claim. ' 276
Does that mean that because defendant pigeon-holed his claim
in the statute, the court would limit its review to whether the
deprivation fell within the statute's purview? -- Or, does that
mean that the right is only statutory in nature? Given the
extensiveness of the due process analysis it is not unreasonable to
conclude that the former applies -- that the court limited review
to the statute because the contention was confined therein.
Regardless of whether one finds the foregoing persuasive,
Favor found the rule, as announced in Dokes, to be merely
statutory in nature. Since state courts are permitted under
Supreme Court precedent to determine the retroactivity of their
own decisions, 277 and Dokes rendered the right to be present
273. Id. at 660, 595 N.E.2d at 839, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 764. The "key
factor" was drawn from People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 213 N.H.2d
445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1965) and People v. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871, 577
N.E.2d 55, 573 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1991) - both of which are due process
decisions.
274. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06.
275. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d at 662, 595 N.E.2d at 838, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 763
(citations omitted).
276. Id.
277. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 261-62, 624 N.E.2d at 635, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
498 (citing American Trucking Assn's v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990)).
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merely statutory in nature, it is subject to balancing under
Pepper.278
Under Pepper, the right to be present in the context of a
Sandoval hearing was to be applied retroactively. 279 The purpose
of the Dokes rule, in applying the first prong of the test, was "to
enable the defendant to contribute his or her peculiar kmowledge
of the relevant facts" to the Sandoval hearing in order to make
the determination more accurate. 280
The second prong under Pepper, the extent of prior reliance on
the old rule, which excluded defendants from Sandoval hearings,
similarly called for retroactive application. 281 This was due to the
fact that there was no consistent rule from the various appellate
division departments "approving the defendant's exclusion from a
Sandoval hearing. '282
The third and final Pepper factor, the impact of the new rule on
the administration of justice, "does not furnish a sound basis for
withholding application of Dokes to all cases currently pending
on direct appeal... [because] there is simply no indication in
the parties' submissions that retroactive application of Dokes
could lead to wholesale reversals." 283
Favor differs from Mitchell, which limited the rule requiring a
defendant's presence during side-bar voir dire conferences to
prospective application, because in Mitchell, defendant's
exclusion was nearly universal and effectuation of the new rule
Mitchell expanded on this concept where the New York Court of Appeals
concluded "[tihe Supreme Court has no concern with the uniformity of our law
and if only a local question is presented, the 'state courts generally have the
authority to determine the retroactivity of their ovm decisions.'" People v.
Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 526, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1384 591 N.Y.S.2d 990,
993 (1992) (quotingAmerican TruckngAssn's, 496 U.S. at 177).
278. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 262-63, 624 N.E.2d at 635-36, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
498-99.
279. Id. at 265, 624 N.E.2d at 637, 604 N.Y.S.2d. at 500.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 265, 624 N.E.2d at 638, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 266, 624 N.E.2d at 638, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
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would have required a reconstruction hearing. 2 84 As such, the
rule requiring a defendant's presence at Sandoval proceedings
was found to be merely statutory in nature but would be applied
in a retroactive fashion.
IV. DEFENDANT CAN VOLUNTARILY OR
INVOLUNTARILY WAIVE OR FORFEIT THE RIGHT
TO BE PRESENT
Although a New York State criminal defendant has a
constitutional and statutory right to be present at the beginning
and during the trial, this right can be waived or forfeited by a
defendant who purposefully absents himself from a known
proceeding.
In the seminal case of People v. Parker,2 85 the New York
Court of Appeals held that a defendant had to be expressly
warned of the consequences of the failure to return to court
before his absence would constitute a waiver of the right to be
present. 2 86 Parker was distinguished in People v. Sanchez,2 87
where the court held that an express warning was not
constitutionally required. 2 88 The Sanchez court adopted the
United States Supreme Court's test as enunciated in Taylor v.
United States:2 89
[]f a defendant at liberty remains away during his trial the court
may proceed provided it is clearly established that his absence is
voluntary. He must be aware of the processes taking place, of
284. Id. Favor's ruling of retroactivity under Pepper's third prong gives
credence to the bootstrapping argument offered earlier. See supra text
accompanying note 252. If the burden on the administration of justice is
negligible, the court is unlikely to limit a new rule to prospective application.
It appears however, if the burden is likely to be high, the court will limit
application regardless of the strength of the other two prongs.
285. 57 N.Y.2d 136, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982).
286. Id. at 141, 440 N.E.2d at 1316, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
287. 65 N.Y.2d 436, 482 N.E.2d 56, 492 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1985).
288. Id. at 440, 482 N.E.2d at 57, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
289. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
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his right and of his obligation to be present, and he must have no
sound reason for remaining away.290
Further, the Sanchez court adopted the rationale underlying the
test enunciated in Diaz v. United States:2 91
The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused
person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the
safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law
sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes
of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and
turn them into a solemn farce.... Neither in criminal nor in
civil cases will the law allow a person to take advantage of his
own wrong. 292
The real issue in these cases, however, is forfeiture. Forfeiture
of the right to be present "occurs by operation of law and as a
matter of public policy," while a waiver can only be found to
exist after an "evaluation of defendant's state of mind." 293 The
key to determining whether a defendant effectively forfeited his
right to be present is whether he "unambiguously indicate[d] a
defiance of the processes of law. '" 294
Thus, the New York rule, as enunciated in Sanchez, provides
that if a defendant deliberately absents himself before or during
trial, or at the time of sentencing, he forfeits his right to be
present regardless of whether the court expressly warns him of
the ramifications of his failure to appear, and regardless of
whether he is cognizant that the trial or other proceeding will
continue in his absence. 295
In People v. Smith,296 the judge considered and reviewed the
record to assess defendant's actions in absenting himself.297 No
290. Sanchez, 65 N.Y.2d at 443, 482 N.E.2d at 59, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 580
(quoting Taylor, 414 U.S. at 19-20).
291. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
292. Sanchez, 65 N.Y.2d at 443, 482 N.E.2d at 59, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 580
(quotingDiaz, 223 U.S. at 458).
293. Id. at 443-44 n.*, 482 N.E.2d at 59 n.*, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 580 n.*
(citations omitted).
294. Id. at 444, 482 N.E.2d at 59, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
295. Id. at 443-44, 482 N.E.2d at 59-60. 492 N.Y.S.2d at 580-81.
296. 68 N.Y.2d 725, 497 N.E.2d 685, 506 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1986).
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forfeiture was found because the defendant did not leave the
courtroom after the trial had begun, nor did he hide once
informed that his trial was to commence. 298 Rather, the
defendant merely failed to appear after being informed several
days earlier about the date of trial.299
CONCLUSION
In times gone by, a defendant's right to be present was
necessary to "prevent [the evil of] secret trials in which the
accused was often arrested and executed without a hearing and
without any knowledge as to who were his accusers, or the
evidence upon which they relied." 300 Of course, as centuries
passed, the purposes for defendant's presence changed. In ancient
times the defendant's presence was necessary for the rendition of
the verdict. In the middle ages, the defendant's presence was
required because otherwise he could not endure the physical trials
by ordeal.
As the common law developed in England, courts could not
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant unless he was present at trial.
Moreover, defendant was not entitled to counsel, so regardless of
how insignificant a trial step was, his presence was mandated.
Presently in New York, the right to be present has been found
in the New York State Constitution, and codified in the laws of
New York. 301 A defendant's right to be present is required at
Sandoval hearings, voir dire conferences dealing with juror biases
or hostilities, summations, taking of evidence, rendition and
recordation of the verdict, instructions to the jury, and a myriad
of other trial stages where the defendant could aid in his defense.
Defendant's presence is not required where his contribution to the
fairness of the proceeding would be minimal. Therefore, his
presence would be useless at discussions between the court and
297. Id. at 726-27, 497 N.E.2d at 685, 506 N.Y.S.2d 318-19.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 296, 50 N.E. 947, 951 (1898).
301. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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counsel dealing only with matters of substantive law or
procedure.
The trend in New York has been to transform, a defendant's
constitutional right to be present, into a mere statutory right
rooted in due process. 302 Such a "constatutory" transformation is
an analytical anomaly. In many instances, the New York Court of
Appeals has clearly found the right to be constitutionally based,
and then in one quick sentence, confines the right to statute.
The court of appeals has done so for many important reasons.
First, the court wants to be free to interpret its constitution as it
sees fit. Because the right can be "found" in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, it is
not surprising that there has been much litigation concerning the
scope of the right for defendants accused of federal crimes. 303
New York defendants have adopted the federal arguments and
have incorporated them into New York State Constitutional due
process arguments. 304
However, once the court of appeals confines the right in a
given situation to statute -- a statute which at first blush seems to
give heightened protection to the defendant - the New York
courts are immunized from the influences of federal case law.
Although federal due process cases interpreting the right to be
present are highly persuasive authority for state courts
interpreting state due process arguments, federal cases are not
binding on New York State courts when they are passing on a
New York statutory right.305 However, the right retains its
302. See supra note 63 (listing New York cases that the decided whether or
not a defendant has a right to be present based upon a statutory claim).
303. See supra note 25 (listing cases involving the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to be present).
304. See, e.g., People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606 N.E.2d 953, 591
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992) (holding that the New York Court of Appeals has
adopted the Supreme Court's due process analysis set fbrth in Snyder); see also
People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 91 N.E.2d 1347, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371
(1979); Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253, 196 N.E.2d 56, 246 N.Y.S.2d 399
(1963); People ac. rel. Bartlam v. Murphy, 9 N.Y.2d 550, 175 N.E.2d 336,
215 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1961).
305. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992).
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fundamental nature even though it now rests in statute and courts
will continue to employ a due process analysis to gauge its
purview.
Inextricably connected with the court's confinement of the right
to statute, is the court's interest in the administration of
justice. 306 Finding the right to be merely statutory in nature,
immunizes the right from automatic retroactive application under
federal law. 307 If the burden on the administration of justice is
heavy, the court is extremely interested in limiting the right to
prospective application.
Aside from confining the right to be present to statute in order
to maintain state sovereignty, the court has relegated the right to
statute because its importance has faded over time.308 Clearly in
Sir Helmsley's narrative, 30 9 his presence at trial was mandatory
because without it, he would forever be an outlaw while having
never been found guilty. Further, no one else could endure his
fire ordeal which was his punishment for murder.
The Favor case3 10 was very different from the Helmsley
hypothetical. Favor had an attorney who could represent him
during the Sandoval hearing at which life or death was not the
immediate issue.
In other contexts outside the Sandoval situation, the court of
appeals indicates that a defendant's presence serves only a
symbolic function as the Helmsley abuses have all but
disappeared from our system. As a result, the right can be
306. See People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 423 N.E.2d 366, 440
N.Y.S.2d 889 (1981) (stating that the third prong of the test that decides
whether a new rule should be applied retroactively is the effect on the
administration of justice of retroactive application); see aLvo supra notes 86
and 211 (stating the three prongs of the Pepper test).
307. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 527, 606 N.E.2d at 1385, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
994.
308. See Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 456, 606 N.E.2d at 957, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
829; see also Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
968.
309. See supra introduction.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 8-21; see also supra text
accompanying notes 259-84.
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regulated by statute and still afford defendant the necessary
fairness.
So where does this leave the right to be present in New York?
The right is left in a state of flux - it is a due process right under
a statutory aegis. It is a constatutory right whose purview will
invariably be decreased. A defendant's presence will always
contribute to the fairness of a certain, limited number of
proceedings, while in other proceedings, his presence will be
deemed useless; a benefit, but a shadow. As more proceedings
fall under the protection of the statute, less room will be left for
the creation of constitutional arguments. Nevertheless, the right
to be present will remain vital even in the absence of past
criminal justice system abuses.
Steven N. Malitz
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